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Be Modified to Resolve the Issue or Should the Focus
Be on a Shared Taxing Rights Mechanism?
Lisa Spinosa* & Vikram Chand**
The issue arises as to how can the market jurisdiction tax digital business models, in particular, highly digitalized businesses from an international direct tax
perspective? It has been argued that creating a new nexus by introducing a digital permanent establishment (PE) or a significant economic presence test seems to
be an ideal long-term solution. However, does that solution really resolve the issue or simply create tax uncertainty for businesses? First, by referring to the
work on BEPS Action 7, the authors argue that not all states like to amend the PE definition. Moreover, for states that adopted the amendments to counter
artificial avoidance of the PE status, the authors argue that the profits attributable to the PE will be restricted to the limited functions performed by the PE or,
when the PE does not perform any functions, the profits attributable will be negligible. This is illustrated by specific references to online retailers that operate
through local warehouses, as well as online advertisers that operate through related local marketing intermediaries. The analysis is based on the premise that
the market jurisdiction follows the authorized OECD approach and considers that the concept of ‘significant people functions’ relevant to risk assumption for
the purpose of Article 7 of the OECD Model is similar to the concept of ‘control over risk’ relevant to risk and return allocation for the purpose of Article 9.
Conversely, if the concept of ‘significant people functions’ includes day-to-day risk mitigation functions, it could be argued that the risks associated with these
functions should be allocated to the PE even though they are performed at the level of the head office and consequently, the PE would be entitled to additional
income. Thus, the tax outcome would depend on how one interprets the concept of ‘significant people functions’. On the other hand, alternate approaches (such as
formulary approaches) can be used if the market jurisdiction does not adopt the authorized OECD approach. Therefore, tax uncertainty does exist, as
attribution of profits under the current framework is unclear and lacks uniformity. Second, the authors argue that prior to introducing a new nexus in the
form of a digital PE or a significant economic presence, the approach to profit attribution needs to be investigated. To resolve the attribution issue for the new
digital nexus, both academics and the OECD have proposed several solutions, such as modifying the existing attribution framework, relying on deemed profit
methods or formulary apportionment. Undoubtedly, these solutions will require a significant departure from existing attribution standards, which themselves
are unsettled. Consequently, developing special attribution rules for digitalized businesses only would breach the principle of equality. Moreover, tax
uncertainty can arise if the new attribution framework for the digital nexus is not accepted in a clear and uniform manner. Overall, the authors are of the
opinion that traditional businesses and digitalized businesses should be treated equally. As a result , unless and until new nexus rules and new attribution
rules are developed and applied for ‘all enterprises’, a digital PE or a significant economic presence PE targeted at digitalized businesses should not be pursued.
Nevertheless, if States wish to tax highly digitalized businesses, the authors assert a ‘shared taxing rights’ mechanism, in other words, a new distributive rule
that could be built into tax treaties to tax specified digital activities or services that operate on a remote basis. In a subsequent article, the authors will
undertake a detailed analysis of the solution.
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Issue
Enterprises across the globe are benefiting from the
impact of the digital innovation.1 For this reason, it
can be argued that the ‘digital economy is increasingly
becoming the economy itself’.2 Thus, ring-fencing the
digitalized economy for tax purposes would be chal-
lenging. In times where ‘international tax issues have
never been as high on the political agenda as they are
today’3 and ‘where non-resident taxpayers can derive
Notes
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1 See OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy – Action 1: 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project 11 (OECD Publishing
2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/addressing-the-tax-challenges-of-the-digital-economy-action-1-2015-final-report_9789264241046-en (accessed 28 Feb. 2018).
It is worth noting that an interim report on the tax challenges arising from digitalization has been released by the OECD in Mar. 2018. See OECD, Tax Challenges Arising
from Digitalization – Interim Report 2018: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing 2018), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/taxation/tax-challenges-arising-from-digitalisation-interim-report_9789264293083-en (accessed 16 Mar. 2018). Where appropriate, this report will be cited as
‘2018 Interim Report’.
2 OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, at 11.
3 Ibid., at 3.
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substantial profits from transactions with customers
located in another country’,4 the main tax issue related
to the digitalized economy concerns the way market
(source) jurisdictions can tax the income derived by
enterprises operating in the digital sphere, as such
businesses can earn profits in a country without any
physical presence.5
1.2 Digitalization and Digitalized
Business Models
1.2.1 Introductory Remarks
Digitalization has enhanced the manner in which tradi-
tional brick-and-mortar businesses operate. At the same
time, digitalization has also opened doors for new busi-
ness models that operate substantially in the digital
sphere (in other words, highly digitalized businesses).
For the purpose of this article, the authors propose five
broad categories of businesses operating in the digital
sphere:6
– businesses selling physical products through an online plat-
form. These businesses could manufacture or create
their own physical products for sale. For example
H&M7 sells its clothing line through its shops and
through its website. Alternatively, these businesses
could buy products from third parties for the purpose
of resale. For example Walmart8 acts as a reseller for
tangible products.
– businesses selling digitalized products and content through an
online platform. These businesses can either produce
their own content that is sold through the Internet.
For example, Netflix9 commercializes its original pro-
duction through the digital sphere. Alternatively,
such businesses could act as resellers for digitalized
products. Once again, this would be the case where
Netflix purchases content for resell. Similarly, in our
understanding, Apple10 resells soundtrack rights
through the iTunes stores;
– businesses providing an online marketplace for the sale of goods
and services. These businesses typically act as intermedi-
aries and connect suppliers of goods or services and
potential customers. For example eBay11 provides an
online platform where suppliers can list their products
and consumers can buy them. Similarly, Booking.com12
provides a platform that connects businesses that offer
accommodation and accommodation seekers. Likewise,
businesses involved in the so-called sharing economy,13
such as Uber and Airbnb,14 could fall under this
category;
– businesses providing online services. This category encom-
passes, for example, businesses that are involved in
online advertising such as Facebook15 (social network)
or Google16 (search engine), online payments services
such as PayPal17 and online gaming such as GVC
Holdings18 (which owns partypoker.com); and
– businesses providing online solutions. This category mainly
contains cloud computing companies that provide infra-
structure-as-a-service (IaaS), platform-as-a-service (PaaS)
Notes
4 OECD, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status – Action 7: 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project 13 (OECD 5
Oct. 2015).
5 Ibid., at 13. See also Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters [Committee of Experts], Tax Challenges in the Digitalized Economy: Selected Issues for
Possible Consideration, E/C.18/2017/CRP.22, 1–35, para. 39 (17–20 Oct. 2017). Further, see OECD, 2018 Interim Report, supra n. 1, para. 33.
6 This list is not to be considered exhaustive.
7 For more information on this company, as well as on the way it generates revenues, see its annual reports, e.g. The H&M Group, Annual Report 2016 90, https://about.hm.
com/content/dam/hmgroup/groupsite/documents/masterlanguage/Annual%20Report/Annual%20Report%202016.pdf (accessed 22 Feb. 2018).
8 For more information on this company, as well as on the way it generates revenues, see its annual reports, e.g. Walmart, 2017 Annual Report 43, http://s2.q4cdn.com/
056532643/files/doc_financials/2017/Annual/WMT_2017_AR-(1).pdf (accessed 22 Feb. 2018).
9 For more information on this company, as well as on the way it generates revenues, see its annual reports, e.g. Netflix, Inc., Annual Report 2016 57, https://ir.netflix.com/
static-files/27fa46ea-eb9a-4b64-8d4e-8496ed097587 (accessed 22 Feb. 2018).
10 For more information on this company, as well as on the way it generates revenues, see its annual reports, e.g. Apple Inc., Annual Report 2017 33, http://files.shareholder.com/
downloads/AAPL/6038430634x0x962680/D18FAEFF-460A-4168-993D-A60CBA8ED209/_10-K_2017_As-Filed_.pdf (accessed 22 Feb. 2018).
11 For more information on this company, as well as on the way it generates revenues, see its annual reports, e.g. eBay Inc., Annual Report 2017 F-2 and F-9, https://investors.
ebayinc.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1065088-18-9&CIK=1065088 (accessed 22 Feb. 2018).
12 For more information on this company, as well as on the way it generates revenues, see its annual reports, e.g. The Priceline Group, Annual Report 2016 80 and 108, http://ir.
bookingholdings.com/static-files/b8b5291e-c57f-4597-96db-96ae95fe7040 (accessed 22 Feb. 2018).
13 For a definition of the ‘sharing economy’, see e.g. G. Beretta, Taxation of Individuals in the Sharing Economy, 45(1) Intertax (2017).
14 Both companies are not listed companies. Thus, they do not publish an annual report for the public at large.
15 For more information on this company, as well as on the way it generates revenues, see its annual reports, e.g. Facebook, Annual Report 2016 39, https://s21.q4cdn.com/
399680738/files/doc_financials/annual_reports/FB_AR_2016_FINAL.pdf (accessed 22 Feb. 2018).
16 For more information on this company, as well as on the way it generates revenues, see its annual reports, e.g. Alphabet Inc., Annual Report 2017 27–28, https://abc.xyz/
investor/pdf/20171231_alphabet_10K.pdf (accessed 22 Feb. 2018).
17 For more information on this company, as well as on the way it generates revenues, see its annual reports, e.g. PayPal, Annual Report 2016 40–41, https://investor.paypal-corp.
com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1633917-17-27&CIK=1633917 (accessed 22 Feb. 2018).
18 For more information on this company, as well as on the way it generates revenues, see its annual reports, e.g. GVC Holdings PLC, Annual Report 2016 78, note 1.11, https://
gvc-plc.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/GVC_Annual_Reports_2016.pdf (accessed 14 May 2018).
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or software-as-a-service (SaaS). For example the authors
understand that Microsoft Azure19 provides such services.
Companies could also be engaged in all the above-mentioned
businesses (such as Amazon20 or Alibaba21) or a combination
thereof. Therefore, it becomes difficult to classify them under
one category or another.22 Furthermore, new businesses are
still emerging with the digitalization of the economy, such
as businesses dealing with 3D printing, virtual currencies
and robotics. These emerging businesses could further dis-
rupt traditional businesses and may well create new business
models.
1.2.2 The Value Creation Process and the Main
Characteristics of Digitalized Businesses
In general, there are three broad value configuration tools that
could be used to understand the value creation process. The
first tool deals with undertaking a value chain analysis. This
model is relevant for businesses where inbound and outbound
logistics are of critical importance.23 For instance, this frame-
work can be used to understand the value creation process for
‘businesses selling physical products through an online platform’ or
‘businesses selling digitalized products through an online platform’.
The second tool involves undertaking a value network analy-
sis. This model is relevant for businesses where mediation is
essential. For example, this framework can be used to under-
stand the value creation process of ‘businesses providing an online
marketplace for the sale of goods and services’ and ‘businesses providing
online services’.24 Finally, the last tool deals with undertaking a
value shop analysis. This tool is relevant for businesses where
intensive use of technology is necessary to solve a customer-
oriented issue. To illustrate, the tool can be used to understand
the value creation process of ‘businesses providing online
solutions’.25 By applying the foregoing tools to digitalized
businesses, the following key characteristics emerge.
In the OECD/G20 BEPS Action 1 Final Report, six key
features were identified in relation to the tax challenges raised
by the digitalization of the economy, namely: (1) mobility of
intangibles, users and business functions, (2) reliance on data,
(3) network effects, (4) use of multi-sided business models, (5)
tendency towards monopoly or oligopoly and (6) volatility.26
Nevertheless, the authors believe that tax challenges arise
from three key features of digitalized businesses,27 namely
(1) their use of intangibles, (2) their reliance on data and
users and (3) their ability to commercialize through digital
means or in the online sphere (Figure 1).











First, digitalized businesses rely heavily on intangibles in
order to grow and create value. Therefore, enterprises
operating in this sphere invest substantially in the devel-
opment of intangibles.28 Given the mobility of
intangibles,29 enterprises can assign and transfer IP rights
within a group,30 especially to low-tax jurisdictions.
The second key characteristic concerns the importance of
users and data in the value creation process.31 Undoubtedly,
data generated from users is important for any business.
Notes
19 For more information on this company, as well as on the way it generates revenues, see its annual reports, e.g. Microsoft, Annual Report 2017 54–55, https://www.microsoft.
com/investor/reports/ar17/index.html (accessed 22 Feb. 2018).
20 For more information on this company, as well as on the way it generates revenues, see its annual reports, e.g. Amazon, Annual Report 2016 42, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/
phoenix.zhtml?c=97664&p=irol-reportsannual (accessed 22 Feb. 2018).
21 For more information on this company, as well as on the way it generates revenues, see its annual reports, e.g. Alibaba Group Holding Limited, Annual Report 2017 116–117,
http://www.alibabagroup.com/en/ir/pdf/form20F_170615.pdf (accessed 22 Feb. 2018).
22 See OECD, 2018 Interim Report, supra n. 1, para. 98.
23 Michael Porter has developed the value chain analysis tool. See Michael Porter, Competitive Advantage Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (The Free Press, 1985).
Although the tool has been widely used, both in academia and real-life businesses, its usage has been criticized because of its lack of application to businesses which are
service oriented as well as firms that operate on a global basis. Thus, alternate tools have been developed, such as the ‘value network’ and ‘value shop’. See OECD, 2018
Interim Report, supra n. 1, paras 74–79.
24 See OECD, 2018 Interim Report, supra n. 1, paras 80–88.
25 See Ibid., paras 89–97.
26 OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, para. 151.
27 See OECD, 2018 Interim Report, supra n. 1, paras 32–35. Also see European Commission, Taxation of Digital Activities in the Single Market [leaked report] 1, https://www.
politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/taxation-of-digital-economy-2.pdf (accessed 28 Feb. 2018).
28 OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, paras 152–153.
29 Ibid., paras 152–163.
30 Ibid., para. 153.
31 Ibid., paras 164–168.
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However, the degree of importance depends on the core
activity of the enterprise. For example the existence of a
cloud computing business does not depend on data generated
from users.32 On the other hand, a social network platform
would not exist without users and the data these users gen-
erate. Therefore, the data collected from active participation of
users plays a vital role in the ability of business to create
revenue, for instance, through targeted advertising. From a
tax perspective, the question arises as to how states value and
tax such data,33 in particular, ‘Big Data’.34 The authors are of
the opinion that it would be extremely challenging for states
to develop a framework to tax such raw data.35
Lastly, the evolution of information and communication
technologies has created a highly integrated and connected
world. Barriers to internationalization are thus lowered.36 It
is now possible to manage businesses centrally and reach
customers across the globe without being physically present
in the location.37 This characteristic, particularly, challenges
the ability of market jurisdictions to tax profits generated
within their borders, as the international tax framework
traditionally relies on tangible/physical features.38
1.3 The Response of Policy Makers and States
1.3.1 Policy Makers
In the Action 1 Final Report, the OECD proposed five
non-binding options that states can consider adopting
to tax digitalized businesses, namely: (1) amendment
of the existing definition of ‘permanent establishment’
(PE)39 in the OECD Model Tax Convention40 (OECD
Model) which was partially achieved through the
Multilateral Instrument (MLI),41 (2) introduction of a
‘significant economic presence’ test,42 (3) application
of a withholding tax on goods or services,43 (4)
adoption of an equalization levy44 and (5) a VAT
solution.45 However, none of these options (1 to
4) were recommended for implementation. In July
2017, the G20 mandated46 that the OECD provide a
solution for tax issues raised by the digital economy.
Subsequently, the OECD invited public input on the
tax challenges of digitalization47 and thereafter held a
public consultation in California.48 An interim report
on this matter has been published in March 2018. The
report discusses the merits and demerits of a short-
term solution viz., an excise tax on e-services (see
section 1.4) and the path that has to be followed to
develop a long-term solution i.e. revising the nexus
and profit allocation rules (see section 3). The OECD
will issue a final report in 2020.
The UN, similar to the OECD, has not yet made a
formal proposal, but has already discussed its view on
possible solutions.49 For example the UN discusses the
expansion of the treaty article on fees for
technical services,50 the introduction of the concept
of a digital PE51 or a significant economic presence
Notes
32 See also OECD, 2018 Interim Report, supra n. 1, para. 35.
33 See Ibid., para. 372.
34 OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, para. 166.
35 This position is also highlighted in S. de Jong, W. Neuvel & Á. Uceda, Dealing with Data in a Digital Economy, 25(2) Int’l Transfer Pricing J. 6 (2018).
36 M. P. Devereux & J. Vella, Implications of Digitalization for International Corporate Tax Reform, 07 Working Paper Series 1 (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation
2017).
37 OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, para. 159.
38 M. Olbert & C. Spengel, International Taxation in the Digital Economy: Challenge Accepted?, 9(1) World Tax J. 4 (2017).
39 OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, paras 215–217.
40 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2014 (Full Version) (OECD 2015). All references to this Model Tax Convention are based on this version. Where
appropriate, references are also made to the recently updated OECD Model. OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017 (OECD 2017).
41 The MLI is an instrument that allows countries to modify, to various degrees, all of their tax treaties. The MLI has been signed by sixty-eight countries during the signing
ceremony on 7 June 2017. Since then, ten additional states signed the Convention and six jurisdictions have expressed their intent to do so. See OECD, Multilateral
Convention to Implement tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD 2017) http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-
implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-BEPS.pdf (accessed 19 Feb. 2018).
42 OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, para. 277. It could result in a new form of nexus or take the form of a significant economic presence PE. For more information on the
proposal, see OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, paras 277–291.
43 OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, para. 292. For more information on the proposal, see OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, paras 292–301.
44 OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, para. 302. For more information, see OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, paras 302–308.
45 For more information on that proposal, see OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, paras 309–339.
46 OECD, OECD Secretary – General Report to G20 Leaders 14 (OECD 2017) http://www.oecd.org/ctp/oecd-secretary-general-tax-report-g20-leaders-july-2017.pdf (accessed 22
Feb. 2018).
47 OECD, OECD Invites Public Input on the Tax Challenges of Digitalization (22 Sept. 2017) http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/oecd-invites-public-input-on-the-tax-challenges-of-
digitalisation.htm (accessed 22 Feb. 2018).
48 For public inputs, see OECD, Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation: Comments Received on the Request for Input – Part I, 1 (2017); OECD, Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation:
Comments Received on the Request for Input – Part II 279, paras 7–13 and 20–42 (2017). For a summary of these inputs, see de Jong, Neuvel & Uceda, supra n. 35.
49 Committee of Experts, supra n. 5, paras 51–65.
50 Ibid., para. 51.
51 Ibid., paras 53–57.
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test.52 Moreover, the UN also discusses fundamental
corporate tax reforms, such as the introduction of a
destination-based cash flow tax, but warns of the
uncertainties that such a radical reform would
generate.53
The EUCommission has also voiced its opinion on the issue
at stake in the context of its strategywith respect to theDigital
Single Market.54 In its report issued in September 2017, the
Commission discusses both long-term and short-term solu-
tions. For the former, it seems that the Commission favours a
revision of the PE concept that could be implemented through
the common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB).55 For
the latter, the Commission listed the following three options:
(1) an equalization levy on turnover of digitalized companies,
(2) a withholding tax on digital transactions and (3) a levy on
revenues generated from the provision of digital services or
advertising activity.56 However, the Commission did not
recommend any specific option and has highlighted that
furtherwork should be undertaken in this area, notably regard-
ing the compatibility of such solutions with EU law
requirements.57 In another report issued in late November
2017, the Commission takes the view that the introduction of
a virtual PE, along with the necessary changes to profit attri-
bution as well as the transfer-pricing framework, should be
explored.58 Finally, in March 2018, the Commission released
its draft proposals for a digital services tax as a short-term
solution (see section 1.4) and a significant digital presence PE as
a long-term solution (see section 3).59
1.3.2 The Response of Selected States
While policy makers are still discussing and debating the
appropriate solution, several countries have already
enacted unilateral measures. These measures, depending
on the jurisdiction, could apply to ‘all enterprises’ or
could be targeted only at ‘digital enterprises’.60
The first type of unilateral measures is targeted
towards large multinational taxpayers. For instance
the United Kingdom has enacted a diverted profits tax
which aims at taxing 25% of all the profits earned
through mechanisms either used by non-UK compa-
nies to avoid trading through a UK PE or by
UK companies engaging in intragroup transactions
that lack economic substance.61 Australia adopted a
similar law, the Tax Integrity Multinational Anti-
Avoidance Law, targeting foreign companies that gen-
erate sales in Australia through local activities/initia-
tives but conclude contracts with customers on a
remote basis.62
The second type of measures targets alternate appli-
cations of the PE concept. For example, the tax admin-
istration of Saudi Arabia has asserted that physical
presence in the market state is not required in order
to trigger the existence of a service PE. Thus, a foreign
service provider could be considered to have a service
PE in Saudi Arabia even if the services are provided
remotely for more than six months.63 Needless to say,
it could be argued that this interpretation clearly
conflicts with the international understanding of the
service PE concept.64 Israel has released a Circular on
the Internet activity of foreign companies in Israel.65
The Circular states that foreign companies that are
resident in treaty jurisdictions, will be deemed to
have a PE in Israel if they operate in Israel with a
significant digital presence.66 Lastly, India67 has
Notes
52 Ibid., paras 58–61.
53 Ibid., para. 66. On the subject of fundamental reforms, see e.g. Devereux & Vella, supra n. 36, at 25.
54 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single
Market, COM(2017) 547 final (21 Sept. 2017), at 1–11.
55 European Commission, supra n. 54, at 9.
56 Ibid., at 10.
57 Ibid., at 10.
58 European Commission, ‘A’ Item Note: Council Conclusions on ‘Responding to the Challenges of Taxation of Profits of the Digital Economy’, 15175/17 FISC 320 ECOFIN 1064 (30
Nov. 2017), at 1–8, paras 13–22.
59 See European Commission, supra n. 27. See also European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the
provision of certain digital services, COM (2018) 148 final (21 Mar. 2018), at 1–36; European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate
taxation of a significant digital presence, COM(2018) 147 final (21 Mar. 2018), at 1–20.
60 See OECD, 2018 Interim Report, supra n. 1, paras 341–366.
61 E.g. H. Self, The UK’s New Diverted Profits Tax: Compliance with EU Law, 43(4) Intertax 333 (2015); S. Wagh, The Taxation of Digital Transactions in India: The New
Equalization Levy, 70(9) Bull Int’l Tax’n 538, 539–540 (2016); Committee of Experts, supra n. 5, para. 24.
62 S. Basak, Equalization Levy: A New Perspective of E-Commerce Taxation, 44(11) Intertax 845 (2016); Olbert & Spengel, supra n. 38, at 20; Committee of Experts, supra n. 5, para. 25.
63 V. A. Gidirim, Taxation of Foreign Multinationals Enterprises Conducting Business in and with Saudi Arabia, 70(4) Bull Int’l Tax’n 230, 233–234 (2016); Committee of Experts,
supra n. 5, para. 27.
64 Committee of Experts, Article 5: The Meaning of the Same or a Connected Project, E/C.18/2015/CRP.9 (19–23 Oct. 2015), 1–8, paras 1–2.
65 EY, Israeli Tax Authorities Publish Official Circular on Internet Activity of Foreign Companies in Israel, Global Tax Alert (15 Apr. 2016) http://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/
international-tax/alert–israeli-tax-authorities-publish-official-circular-on-internet-activity-of-foreign-companies-in-israel (accessed 14 May 2018).
66 Committee of Experts, supra n. 5, para. 28.
67 Government of India, Memorandum to the Finance Bill 2018, at 7 (2018).
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recently adopted the significant economic presence test
that applies to all enterprises.68
The third type of measures introduces turnover taxes
for specific digital businesses. Hungary, for its part, has
introduced an advertisement tax for the publishing sector
that could also apply to online advertisers.69 India, intro-
duced the equalization levy70 for business-to-business
online advertisement. In the recent budget, Italy intro-
duced a web tax on certain digital transactions.71
Finally, the fourth type of measure introduces targeted
withholding taxes. For example, Turkey has issued a draft
law with regard to withholding taxes on income derived
by social network platforms or selected online activities.72
1.4 Focus on a Long-Term Solution
With respect to a short-term solution, the European
Commission has put forward a Directive for a digital services
tax. However, the OECD, in its report, recognizes ‘that there
is no consensus on the merits of, or need for, interim
measures’.73 Nevertheless, for States that wish to adopt equal-
ization levies or (excise taxes), both the European Commission
and the OECD state that the measures should be applicable to
selected digitalized businesses such as businesses providing an
online marketplace or businesses engaged in online
advertising.74 Such levies, in the authors’ opinion, depending
on the way they are adopted, could conflict with the interna-
tional legal tax framework. First, it could be argued that tax
treaties could cover such levies (under the provision that deals
with covered taxes) and thus the business profit provision of
the respective treaty would prohibit their application.75
Second, if the levies are applied only to non-residents within
the EU, such rules could conflict with EU primary law, in
particular the fundamental freedoms.76 Third, equalization
levies could raise compatibility issues with international
trade obligations.77 The OECD in the interim report also
identifies these issues.78 Moreover, such rules could be incom-
patible with the Constitutional Law provisions of certain
States.
On the other hand, with respect to a long-term solution,
in light of the responses of policy makers and selected states,
it is clear that one of the potential long-term options for
taxing digitalized businesses is to create a new nexus by
introducing a digital PE or a significant economic presence
test. This article will discuss and comment on whether that
solution really resolves the issue at stake or creates tax
uncertainty for businesses. In this regard, the authors, by
referring to the work on BEPS Action 7, emphasize that
changing the PE definition may have several shortcomings.
Notably, these shortcomings are illustrated through two
case studies dealing with digitalized businesses such as
online retailers that operate through local warehouses, as
well as online advertisers that operate through related local
marketing intermediaries (section 2). Next, the authors
discuss the current state of play as regards the new nexus
(digital PE or significant economic presence) and express
their perspective on adopting this new option. They put
forth the view that if the PE definition as well as the profit
attribution rules are amended, these changes should apply
to all enterprises (section 3). In light of the tax uncertainty
that may arise by pursuing the digital PE option, the
authors consider an alternate targeted solution. This solu-
tion is briefly presented (section 4) andwill be discussed in a
subsequent article.
2 LESSONS FROM BEPS ACTION 7 WITH
SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO DIGITALIZED
BUSINESS MODELS
2.1 Non-Uniform Implementation
of Amendments to the PE Definition
2.1.1 Introductory Comments
Business profits of a non-resident enterprise are taxable in
the market state only when a PE is constituted therein.79
The definition of the term ‘permanent establishment’ is
Notes
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found in Article 5 of the OECD Model. Article 5(1) and
Article 5(2) address the situation when a fixed place/
physical PE arises. Article 5(3) deals with situations
where construction-related activities constitute a PE.
Article 5(5) and Article 5(6) deal with situations where
an agency PE arises. Finally, Article 5(4) contains excep-
tions to the PE definition.
In the Action 7 Final Report, it has been highlighted
that taxpayers could circumvent the creation of a PE: (1)
by splitting up contracts in order to take advantage of the
12-month threshold provided by Article 5(3),80 (2) by
relying on the specific activity exceptions listed in
Article 5(4)81 and (3) through the use of commissionaires
or other arrangements by relying on the literal wording of
Article 5(5) and (6).82 Thus, the rationale of BEPS Action
7 was to modify Article 5 of the OECD Model.83
For the purpose of this article, amendments to Article 5
(4), (5) and (6) of the OECD Model will be discussed. These
amendments, which do not represent minimum standards,84
have been adopted by a number of states pursuant to Articles
12 and 13 of the MLI, respectively. Consideration of Article
5(3) is beyond the scope of this article, as it is not directly
concerned with the issue at stake.
2.1.2 Preparatory and Auxiliary Activities
Article 5(4) of the OECD Model lists the exceptions to
the PE concept. If the activities performed in the market
jurisdiction are covered by this provision, a PE does not
arise. The key aim of this provision is to exempt activities
that are ‘preparatory or auxiliary’ in nature.
However, due to the evolution of business models, activ-
ities once considered as non-core activities have now become
core activities.85 Moreover, over the past few years, multi-
national groups have been fragmenting their activities in the
market jurisdiction in such a way that these activities, on an
isolated basis, would be considered to be ‘preparatory or
auxiliary’ even though, taken from an overall perspective,
they would be considered to constitute core activities.86 To
counter such avoidance strategies, the Action 7 Final Report
proposed amendments to Article 5(4) to ‘prevent the exploi-
tation of … specific exceptions to the PE definition … , an
issue which is particularly relevant in the digital economy’.87
Two solutions were proposed which can be selected by states
independently of each other.
First, to link Article 5(4) back to its original purpose, i.
e. is the exemption applies only to ‘preparatory and aux-
iliary activities’,88 states can choose between two options
(Article 13(1) of the MLI).89 Option A, which is reflected
in Article 13(2) of the MLI, results in the addition of a
specific ‘preparatory or auxiliary’ condition to each exemp-
tion listed in Article 5(4) of the OECD Model.90 Thirty-
nine signatories to the MLI have adopted this option.91 On
the other hand, Option B, which is reflected in Article 13
(3) of the MLI,92 allows contracting states to preserve the
existing exemptions of Article 5(4)(a)–(d), ‘to ensure that
those exceptions will apply irrespective of whether the
activity is of a preparatory or auxiliary character’.93 This
option has been provided for states that considered the
addition of a specific condition (i.e. in Option A) super-
fluous, as the listed activities of Article 5(4) are intrinsically
‘preparatory or auxiliary’ in nature. Although it is argued
that Option B provides for greater certainty,94 only seven
signatories to the MLI adopted it.95
Second, to prevent fragmentation of activities, states can
adopt an anti-fragmentation rule which is reflected in
Notes
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83 OECD, Action 7 Final Report, supra n. 4, at 14.
84 The MLI agreed minimum standards are (1) the peer review process to address harmful tax practices pursuant to BEPS Action 5, (2) the treaty abuse provisions pursuant to
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89 They can also choose not to apply any of these options.
90 OECD, Action 7 Final Report, supra n. 4, at 28–29.
91 See the MLI positions adopted by Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Curaçao, Egypt, Fiji,
Gabon, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Uruguay.
92 OECD, Action 7 Final Report, supra n. 4, at 38.
93 OECD, Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting para. 169 (OECD Publishing
2016).
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Statement to the MLI (2016), supra n. 93, para. 173.
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Article 13(4) of the MLI.96 States that choose either Option
A or Option B will, by default, adopt this rule, unless they
specifically reserve their position pursuant to Article 13(6)
(a) or (c) of the MLI.97 Notably, the anti-fragmentation rule
may also apply even if the parties to a covered tax agree-
ment do not choose either option,98 as well as if their
choice of option does not match.99 Initially, it seemed
that the rule was aimed at states that ultimately adopt
Option B.100 However, some states that have selected
Option B have reserved their position on the applicability
of the rule.101 Therefore, the implementation of the amend-
ments to Article 5(4) through the MLI does not reflect the
original policy purpose laid out in Action 7.102
2.1.3 Agency Permanent Establishments
Article 5(5) stipulates the conditions for triggering an agency
PE103 in the market jurisdiction. However, Article 5(6) con-
tains an exception for independent agents.104 The relative
narrowness of Article 5(5) arising from the terms: ‘acting on
behalf of an enterprise’ (emphasis added) and ‘authority to
conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise’ (emphasis
added), coupled with the broad definition of ‘independent
agent’, have allowed taxpayers to prevent the creation of a
PE,105 especially with regard to commissionaire structures.106
To counter such practices, the Action 7 Final Report proposed
amendments to paragraphs 5 and 6. Changes in paragraph 5,
which are reflected in Article 12(1) of the MLI, lower the
threshold for triggering an agency PE.107 Modifications to
paragraph 6, which are reflected in Article 12(2) of the MLI,
make the independence rule stricter.108 Thirty-five signa-
tories to the MLI109 have adopted this provision with respect
to their covered tax agreements.110
2.2 Non-Uniform Attribution of Profits rules
to a Permanent Establishment
2.2.1 Various Approaches Followed in Tax Treaties
Even if a PE arises as a result of the amendments, it is
necessary to determine the profits attributable to the PE.
Under Article 7(2) of the OECD Model (2010/2014/2017
version), which provides for the separate entity principle,111
the profits attributable to the PE are those that the PE would
have earned acting on an arm’s length basis.112 A two-step
approach, also known as the authorized OECD approach, is
provided to determine the profits attributable to a PE.113 The
first step involves carrying out a functional and factual analysis
to hypothesize the PE. In other words, this step entails under-
standing the activities carried out by the PE (considering its
significant people functions, assets and risks) and its dealings
with associated enterprises, including the head office.114 The
second step involves pricing the dealing with the associated
enterprise(s) by reference to transfer pricing principles.115
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On the other hand, even though the Commentary on
Article 7(2) of the OECD Model (2008) endorsed the
authorized OECD approach, differences did exist between
both versions.116 The major difference related to recogni-
tion of intra-enterprise dealings, specifically the deduction
of dealings between the head office and PE. Also, the
2008 version included provisions that were considered
not to be consistent with the arm’s length principle, i.e.
Article 7(3),117 (4)118 and (5).119
Provisions similar to Article 7 of the OECD Model
(2008) are also found in Article 7 of the UN Model120
(2011)(with certain exceptions). However, the Committee
of Experts on international taxation has rejected the appli-
cation of authorized OECD approach to interpret the
business profits provision of the UN Model.121
States typically conclude tax treaties with each other by
using either the OECD Model (various versions) or the
UN Model. Accordingly, the attribution of profits to a PE
depends on the exact wording contained in the particular
tax treaty. In other words, states can follow the authorized
OECD approach and non-authorized OECD approaches.
For the purpose of the examples discussed in the next
section, the case studies are analysed in light of treaties
that follow the authorized OECD approach.
2.2.2 Special Considerations for the Concept
of Control over Risks v. Significant People
Functions Relevant to the Assumption and/or
Management of Risks
Article 9 of the OECD Model endorses the arm’s length
principle for pricing transactions between associated enter-
prises. The revised OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines122
state that the application of the arm’s length principle
requires a comparison of the related party transaction with
comparable uncontrolled transactions. The two steps of this
analysis are to (1) identify the commercial or financial terms
between related parties and the economically relevant aspects
attached to such terms in order to properly delineate the
related party transaction and (2) undertake a comparability
analysis to compare the controlled transaction with uncon-
trolled transactions.123 In the context of accurately delineat-
ing the transaction, the revised OECD Guidelines state that
returns will be allocated to an entity if that entity controls
the risk and has the financial capacity to bear the risks.124
Control over risk involves:
(1) the capability to make decisions to take on, lay off or
decline a risk-bearing opportunity, together with
the actual performance of that decision-making
function; and
(2) the capability to make decisions on whether and
how to respond to the risks associated with the
opportunity, together with the actual performance
of that decision-making function.125
Significantly, the revised guidance clearly states that (3)
‘the capability to mitigate risk, that is the capability to
take measures that affect risk outcomes, together with the
actual performance of such risk mitigation’126 is not
necessary in order to have control over the risks.127 In
other words, day-to-day risk mitigation functions are not
necessary for attributing risks to a party.
On the other hand, under the authorized OECD
approach, assumption of risks by a PE depends on the
significant people functions carried out by the PE’s person-
nel at the PE location.128 Significant people functions
relevant to risk assumption ‘are those which require active
decision-making with regard to the acceptance and/or man-
agement (subsequent to the transfer) of those risks’.129
The question arises as to whether the risk allocation frame-
work for the purpose of Article 9 and Article 7 of the OECD
Model are similar. The OECD discussion draft on profit
attribution states, ‘While there may be functions that would
be considered both significant people functions for the attri-
bution of risk for the purposes of the AOA and risk control
Notes
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functions for the purposes of Article 9, the conclusion cannot
be drawn that these two concepts are aligned or can be used
interchangeably for purposes of Article 7 and Article 9’.130
Specifically, the key question that arises is whether active
decision-making with regard to risk acceptance and manage-
ment in the context of the authorized OECD approach
includes the afore-mentioned elements (1) and (2) only or
elements (1), (2) as well as (3) which have been discussed in
the context of the revised OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
In other words, do significant people functions include day-
to-day risk mitigation functions?
While this position is debatable, for the purpose of the case
studies in section 2.3, the authors take the position that
significant people functions relevant to risk assumption
include elements (1) and (2)131 only. Nevertheless, the out-
comewhen they include day-to-day functions is also discussed.
2.3 Impact on Digitalized Business Models
2.3.1 Introductory Comments
This section considers the impact of the BEPS Action 7
amendments on two key digital business models, namely
online retailers and online advertisers. The impact for each
model, along with the related profit attribution issue, will
be illustrated through a case study.
2.3.2 Online Retailer Operating in the Market
Jurisdiction Through a Local Physical Warehouse
2.3.2.1 Facts
Online retailers could sell either physical goods or
digitalized goods (such as e-books, videos and down-
loadable music) through the Internet.132 The focus of
this section is on online retailers selling physical goods
(that are owned by the them) through a local ware-
house, as the sale of digitalized goods may not require
any physical presence in the market jurisdiction.133
Consider the following example (Figure 2). An online
retailer, R Co, situated in State R, sells goods through an
online platform in State S (the total sales generated in
State S amount to USD 5,000). The customers (indivi-
duals and business owners) from State S log on to the
website (developed by R Co) and place an order for a
product. The product is then delivered to the customer
from a warehouse that R Co operates directly in State S.
The warehouse, which is operated by several employees, is
used only for the purposes of storing and delivering goods
to customers. On the other hand, employees of R Co take
key decisions and perform the necessary functions related
to intellectual property development and management;
technology development; buying products from third par-
ties for resale; manufacturing own products for sale; over-
seeing storage and delivery activities; global marketing
and sales and after sales services.
Figure 2: The Case of Online Retailer Operating in the









2.3.2.2 Permanent Establishment in the Market
Jurisdiction
Under the old version of Article 5(4), it was argued
that even though a fixed PE place were constituted
under Article 5(1), the exemption of Article 5(4)(a)
would apply, as the provision states ‘the term “perma-
nent establishment” shall be deemed not to include:
(a) the use of facilities solely for the purpose of sto-
rage, display or delivery of goods or merchandise
belonging to the enterprise’. Accordingly, R Co did
not have a PE in State S.134 However, under the new
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134 This position was not accepted by a court in Japan. A US-based taxpayer operating an enterprise, as an individual, sold automobile parts to Japanese customers through
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Arguably, under the old Art. 5(4), the activities in Japan should have fallen within the scope of Art. 5(4)(a) or (b) of the OECD Model. However, the Tokyo Regional Court
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wording that is reflected in Article 13(2) of the MLI
(i.e. Option A), such activity will trigger a PE as ‘the
term “permanent establishment” shall be deemed not
include: (a) the use of facilities solely for the purpose
of storage, display or delivery of goods or merchandise
belonging to the enterprise … provided that such
activity of the fixed place of business, is of preparatory
or auxiliary character’. The Commentary on Article 5
of the OECD Model confirms this position.135
2.3.2.3 Attribution of Profits to the Permanent
Establishment
In the context of the case at hand, applying the two-step
approach put forward by the authorized OECD approach
will lead to the conclusion that:
– under the first step, the PE of the online retailer
will be hypothesized (characterized) as a taxpayer
that is carrying out warehousing activities which
entail providing storage and delivery services to the
head office. These functions could be considered to
be routine in nature, as the key decisions associated
with them are performed at the level of the head
office; and
– under the second step, the PE must be remunerated
on an arm’s length basis for its storage and delivery
activity by reference to transfer pricing principles.
Assume that the following expenses are incurred in State S
for the storage and delivery activity:
– the salary of the employees engaged in the ware-
housing activity (storage and delivery) amount to
USD 40;
– the cost for delivering the products through indepen-
dent service providers (i.e. courier or post) is USD 10;
– the warehouse is rented for USD 40; and
– other operating costs related to the warehouse amount
to USD 10.
Furthermore, a comparability analysis indicates that
independent storage and delivery service providers in
State S operate on a total operating cost-plus
basis of 10%.136 Taking into consideration these
facts, the profits attributable to the PE, are as follows
(Table 1):
Table 1 Attribution of Profits to the PE that Performs Storage
and Delivery Activity
Particulars






Other operating expenses 10
Expenses 100
Profit† 10†
*The amount that R Co would have paid to an inde-
pendent enterprise performing similar storage and deliv-
ery activities
†A return of 10% on total operating costs which can be
considered to be at arm’s length in light of operating margins
earned by independent comparable service providers.
Even though a PE arises and profits are attributed to the
PE, by reference to the transactional net margin method,137
the market jurisdiction will not be able to tax a significant
portion of the sales revenue derived by the online retailer.
This is because, under the authorized OECD approach, the
profits attributed to the PE will be limited to the activities
carried out by the PE, namely storage and delivery activ-
ities as opposed to the activities that generate sales.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the profit split
method should be applied to this case, as the warehousing
activity represents a high value added activity that involves
making unique and valuable contributions. However, if the
employees in the head office make/perform the key deci-
sions associated with all the activities in the value chain,
especially with respect to storage and delivery, the profit
split method should not be applied.138 Put differently, the
day-to-day risk mitigation functions performed at the level
of the PE cannot be considered to constitute significant
people functions relevant to the assumption of risks (storage
and delivery risks). On the other hand, if it is argued that
significant people functions include day-to-day functions,
the risks associated with those day-to-day activities could
be allocated to the PE (storage and delivery risks), even if
the risks are controlled at the level of the head office.
Notes
held that the exceptions listed in that provision should be of ‘preparatory or auxiliary character’, which was not the case, as the storing of such parts in Japan was essential for
conducting the business. Moreover, the Court held that Art. 5(4) of the OECD Model provided a list of examples and was thus not exhaustive. N. Oka, Court Ruling on
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135 OECD, Action 7 Final Report, supra n. 4, para. 13. See also OECD, Model: Commentary on Article 5, supra n. 80, paras 62–64.
136 A return on total operating costs can be considered to be an appropriate profit level indicator for service-oriented transactions. OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra n.
122, paras 2.93 & 2.98–2.102.
137 OECD, ibid., paras 2.64–2.105.
138 OECD, Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 10: Revised Guidance on Profit Splits paras 12–27 (OECD 22 June 2017). For a discussion of a case where the profit split method should
apply, see Dutriez, Attribution of Profits to a Permanent Establishments of a Company engaged in Online sale of Goods Through a Local Warehouse, supra n. 131, para. 4.2.
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Therefore, the PE should be entitled to a higher profit
attribution by resorting to the profit split method. There
is no doubt that this position is debatable.
2.3.3 Online Advertisers Operating in the Market
Jurisdiction Through a Related Local Marketing
Service Provider
2.3.3.1 Facts
Online advertisers typically assist their customers to
advertise their product/service on the Internet in order
to attract potential buyers.139 The focus of this section is
on online advertisers that operate in the market jurisdic-
tion through a related marketing service provider (asso-
ciated intermediary).140 This is because online advertisers
that do not operate with agents (employees or associated
enterprises) in the market jurisdiction may not create a PE
therein.141
Consider the following example (Figure 3): R Co, a
company resident in State R, provides targeted online
advertising services to its clients on its social network
website. S Co, resident in State S and an associated
enterprise, enters into a marketing/sales service contract
with R Co. Pursuant to this agreement, S Co markets
the online advertising services of R Co to potential
clients. Essentially, the employees of S Co play an
active role to convince prospective clients to acquire R
Co’s online advertising services. When the client agrees
to buy the online advertising service, the employees of
S Co indicate the price at which the service will be
provided. However, the employees clearly state that the
client will have to enter into a contract with R Co (via
an online medium such as email). For its sales services,
S Co is remunerated on a fixed percentage basis (5% of
the sales it generates).142 On the other hand, employees
in R Co take key decisions and perform the necessary
functions related to intellectual property development
and management, technology development, establishing
users for the social network through active promotion,
social network platform management, client advertising
as well as global marketing and sales (including over-
seeing marketing and sales activities of S Co).
2.3.3.2 Permanent Establishment in the Market
Jurisdiction
Under the old wording of Article 5(5), it is argued that
R Co did not have a PE in State S, as S Co (through its
employees) did not have the authority to conclude con-
tracts in the name of R Co. For instance in a recent
French case, the Court held that the marketing activ-
ities of the local subsidiary did not constitute a PE for
the non-resident under the Ireland-France tax treaty
(1968).143 However, under the new wording that is









Remuneration on fixed 
percentage basis
Notes
139 OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, para. 136.
140 It is assumed that the intermediary in this case is a taxpayer that would qualify as an ‘associated enterprise’ for the purpose of Art. 9 of the OECD Model. Therefore, the
analysis in this section excludes the situation wherein the intermediary does not qualify as an ‘associated enterprise’ (e.g. when it is an employee of the foreign enterprise). For
the meaning of the term ‘associated enterprise’, see OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra n. 122, at 17, para. 11.
141 E.g. India: Right Florists Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO (Case ITA 1336/Kol./2011) (12 Apr. 2013); India: Publimatic India Pvt. Ltd. v. Department of Income Tax (Case ITA 7044/Mum/2011)
(18 Aug. 2011).
142 OECD, Action 7 Final Report, supra n. 4. See also OECD, Model: Commentary on Article 5, supra n. 80, para. 90.
143 France: Google Ireland Limited v. Administration générale des finances publiques (Case 1505113/1-1) (12 July 2017). Moreover, in the Indian Ebay case, a Swiss resident taxpayer
operated with two group companies in India. The Indian companies provided marketing and support services to the Swiss company. While the Swiss company was not
considered to have a PE in India, the Indian authorities concluded that the taxpayer’s income was taxable in India as ‘fees for technical services’. India: eBay International AG
v. ADIT ITA (Case 6784/M/2010) (21 Sept. 2012).
A Long-Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized Business Models
487
reflected in Article 12(1) of the MLI, R Co would
trigger a PE in State S, as S Co is acting on its behalf
and ‘in doing so, … habitually plays the principal role
leading to the conclusion of contracts that are routinely
concluded without material modification by the enter-
prise, and these contracts’ are ‘in the name’ of R Co or
are for ‘provision of services’ by R Co.144 The
Commentary on the OECD Model provision confirms
this position.145
2.3.3.3 Attribution of Profits to the Permanent
Establishment
In this case, S Co is a dependant agent enterprise and the
PE of R Co is a dependant agent PE (DAPE).
Consequently, Article 9 of the OECD Model146 would
apply to test whether or not the conditions/prices between
R Co and S Co are at arm’s length.147
If an accurate delineation of the transaction through
a proper functional analysis148 indicates that the ‘con-
tractual assumption of risks’ and the ‘actual conduct’
coincide,149 in the sense that R Co ‘controls’ and has
the ‘financial capacity’150 to assume economically sig-
nificant risks (such as risks associated to sales and
marketing as well as credit and collection activities),
R Co will be attributed those risks. On the other hand,
S Co would be attributed limited operational risks
associated with the marketing/sales activity. In these
circumstances, S Co will be characterized as a taxpayer
that provides routine marketing and sales services.
Consequently, it will be treated as the tested party for
undertaking a transfer pricing analysis, given its ‘least
complex’ profile.151
Assume the following numerical facts in the exam-
ple. The total sales generated by S Co in State S on
behalf of R Co amount to USD 10,000. As S Co is
compensated on a fixed percentage on sales basis (5%
on sales), its compensation amounts to USD 500.
Moreover, assume that the total operating expenses
incurred by S Co (including the salaries of the employ-
ees engaged in the marketing activities) amount
to USD 400. Consequently, as shown in Table 2A, S
Co operates on a 25% return on its total operating
costs.152 Furthermore, a comparability analysis indi-
cates that independent marketing/sales service provi-
ders in State S also operate on a 25% return on their
total operating costs. Accordingly, the remuneration
derived by S Co, by applying the transactional net
margin method,153 can be considered to be at arm’s
length.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the profit split
method should be applied to this case, as the activities
of S Co represent a high value added activity that
involves making unique and valuable contributions.
However, if the employees in R Co make/perform the
key decisions associated with all the activities in the
value chain, especially with respect to sales and market-
ing, in the authors’ opinion, the profit split method
should not be applied.154
Table 2A Profit and Loss Statement of S Co (Dependant
Agent)
Particulars









*represents remuneration of 5% on sales
Notes
144 OECD, Action 7 Final Report, supra n. 4, at 16, new Art. 5(5).
145 OECD, Action 7 Final Report, supra n. 4. See also OECD, Model: Commentary on Article 5, supra n. 80, para. 90.
146 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2014 (Full Version), supra n. 40, Art. 9. See also OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version
2017, supra n. 40, Art. 9.
147 OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, supra n. 112, para. 230; OECD, Action 7 Discussion Draft, supra n. 130, para. 11. See also i OECD,
Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, supra n. 130, para. 34.
148 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra n. 122, paras 1.51–1.55.
149 OECD, Action 7 Discussion Draft, supra n. 130, para. 13. See also ibid., para. 36.
150 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra n. 122, paras 1.60–1.109.
151 Ibid., paras 3.18–3.19.
152 A return on total operating costs can be considered to be an appropriate profit level indicator for service oriented transactions. OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra
n. 122, paras 2.93 & 2.98–2.102.
153 OECD, ibid., paras 2.64–2.105.
154 OECD, Action 10 Discussion Draft, supra n. 138, paras 12-27. See also OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra n. 122, paras 12–27. However, in the authors’ opinion, the
profit split method could be applied to a situation where an accurate delineation of the transaction through a proper functional analysis indicates that the ‘contractual
assumption of risks’ and the ‘actual conduct’ do not coincide, in the sense that S Co performs and controls substantial risks rather than R Co. In this situation, S Co cannot be
characterized as a routine marketing service provider. Accordingly, pursuant to Art. 9, S Co needs to be remunerated on an arm’s length basis for its additional functions,
risks and assets that it employs. On this issue, Olbert and Spengel also argue that the profit split method could be applied in situations where the local entity in the market
State is carrying out high value added activities. Olbert & Spengel, supra n. 38, at 34.
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†A return of 25% on operating costs which can be
considered to be at arm’s length
On the other hand, as discussed, the two-step approach
under Article 7(2) of the OECD Model will apply to
determine the profits attributable to the DAPE.155 To
reiterate, the first step involves carrying out a functional
and factual analysis in order to hypothesize the PE, i.e. to
understand the activities carried out by the PE in light of
its significant people functions, assets and risks, and to
understand its dealings (transactions) with associated
enterprises (including the head office). It could be argued
that, under this step, the DAPE does not perform any
significant people functions relevant to the assumption of
risks. The significant people functions relevant to eco-
nomically significant risks (such as risks associated to
sales and marketing), as accurately delineated under
Article 9, are performed and controlled by personnel
working in State R for R Co. Therefore, as the DAPE
does not carry out any significant people functions, it
should not be attributed any risks, and consequently no
profits, as illustrated in Table 2B.156 Accordingly, it
could be argued that once the intermediary has been
compensated on an arm’s length basis, there would not
be further income attribution to the DAPE.157












However, if one applies the approach followed by the recent
OECD Action 7 Discussion Draft (2017) on profit attribu-
tion, different results could arise. The discussion draft158 states
that the profits attributable to the DAPE are equal to sales to
third-party customers,159 as reduced by (1) the amount that R
Co would have received from the DAPE for selling the
advertising space, (2) the amount that R Co would have
received as compensation for other activities carried out for
the purpose of the DAPE160 and (3) arm’s length remunera-
tion of S Co. As discussed, the information with respect to the
sales to third parties and arm’s length remuneration of S Co is
already available. Moreover, assume that the other expenses
incurred by the head office on behalf of the PE amount to USD
100 (see Table 2C).
Table 2C Profit and Loss Statement of the DAPE161
Particulars
(A) Sales to third-party customers as
reduced by
10,000
(1) Purchase of services from head
office
??
(2) Other expenses incurred by
head office for the PE
100
(3) Arm’s length remuneration of S
Co
500
(B) Total operating expenses ??
(C) Profit (loss) ??
The question arises as to how one interprets and
calculates (1), which represents the amount that R Co
would have received if it had sold the advertising space
to an ‘unrelated party performing the same or similar
activities under the same or similar conditions [that S
Co] performs on behalf of [R Co] in Country S (attri-
buting to such party ownership of the assets of [R Co]
related to such functions, and assumption of the risks
related to such functions)’.162 The footnote in the
Action 7 Discussion Draft (2017) states that this ‘is
conceptually equivalent to the amount paid by the PE
for the rights to the advertising space from [R Co].
This would correspond to a “dealing” under the
[authorized OECD approach]’.163
Notes
155 OECD, Action 7 Discussion Draft, supra n. 130, para. 11. See also ibid., para. 34.
156 OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, supra n. 112, paras 233–244.
157 Several commentators agree with this position. See e.g. P. Baker & R. Collier, IFA Cahiers 2006 – Volume 91b. The Attribution of Profits to a Permanent Establishment, General
Report, at 21 (2006). Moreover, the issue has been litigated on several occasions in India. The Mumbai and Delhi High Courts are of the opinion that once the dependent
agent is remunerated on an arm’s length basis, the tax liability of a foreign company in India is extinguished. Thus, no further profits are to be attributed to the DAPE. E.g.
India: SET Satellite (Singapore) Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Director of Income-Tax (Case IT Appeal 994 of 2007) (22 Aug. 2008); India: BBC Worldwide Ltd v. DY Director of Income (Case
ITA 1188 (Del)/06) (15 Jan. 2010).
158 OECD, Action 7 Discussion Draft, supra n. 130, para. 30.
159 Ibid., para. 30, fn. 8.
160 Ibid., para. 30, fn. 10.
161 The table has been created in light of the recent discussion draft issued by the OECD. i OECD, Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent
Establishments, supra n. 130 para. 30, fn. 9.
162 OECD, ibid., para. 25. See also ibid., para. 67.
163 OECD, Action 7 Discussion Draft, supra n. 130 para. 25, footnote 6.
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The framing of these sentences seems to be rather
confusing. It could be argued that the DAPE, as an
unrelated party, would pay USD 10,000 to purchase the
advertising space (the amount at which it is sold to the
third party), as it does not perform any additional func-
tions (other than the functions for which S Co has already
been remunerated). If one follows the approach of the
Discussion Draft, a reasonable argument could be made
that the attribution exercise leads to the conclusion that
the DAPE will be attributed a loss (see Table 2D).
Table 2D Profit and Loss Statement of the DAPE
Particulars
(A) Sales to third party customers
as reduced by
10,000












(B) Total operating expenses 10,600
Profit (loss) (600)
On the other hand, another reading of the sentences could
lead to the conclusion that (1) the functions performed by S
Co such as day-to-day marketing/sales, which would consti-
tute significant people functions, should be attributed to the
DAPE, and consequently (2) all risks associated with those
functions should be attributed to the DAPE, irrespective of
the place where they are performed. If this approach were
followed, the functions performed at the level of the head
office and the associated risks (marketing or sales related
risks) could be attributed to the DAPE. This would, thus,
enhance the profits attributable to the DAPE. There is no
doubt that this position is debatable.
2.4 Summary: The Key Lessons from BEPS
Action 7
Not all signatories of the MLI adopted the revised versions of
Article 5(4), (5) and (6). It is thus clear that states have not
implemented Action 7 on a uniform basis. A first red flag
emerges which indicates that changing the PE definition
may not be a suitable proposition for all.164 Second, even for
states that adopted the amendments, the issue of profit
attribution persists. Specifically, with respect to digital busi-
ness models, online retailers (sellers and re-sellers) that oper-
ate through local warehouses will no longer be able to argue
that a PE does not arise in the market jurisdiction. Even if a
PE arises, the taxable profit in the market jurisdiction will
be restricted to the limited functions performed by the PE,
namely storage and delivery activities. Moreover, online
advertisers (and any other digital businesses) that operate
through related marketing intermediaries in the market
jurisdiction could trigger a DAPE therein. However, as
illustrated, it could be argued that once the related inter-
mediary is compensated on an arm’s length basis, there
should not be further profit attribution to the PE.165 The
analysis rests on the premise that the market jurisdiction
follows the authorized OECD approach and considers that
the concept of ‘significant people functions’ relevant to risk
assumption for the purposes of Article 7 of the OECDModel
is similar to the concept of ‘control over risk’ relevant to risk
allocation for the purpose of Article 9 of the OECD
Model.166 On the other hand, if the concept of ‘significant
people functions’ include day-to-day risk mitigation func-
tions, it could be argued that the risks associated with these
functions should be allocated to the PE even though they are
controlled at the level of the head office, and consequently,
the PE would be entitled to additional income. Thus, the tax
outcome would depend on how one interprets the concept of
significant people functions. Thus, a second red flag emerges
with regard to profit attribution.
3 THE NEW NEXUS AND PROFIT ALLOCATION
RULES
3.1 The Current State of Play for Taxing
Digital Business Models
3.1.1 Defining Nexus for Digitalized Businesses
In order to ensure market state taxation of digital busi-
nesses that operate on a remote basis, commentators have
expressed the opinion that the concept of a digital or a
virtual PE should be introduced. For example Pistone and
Hongler make a commendable proposition, stating follows:
If an enterprise resident in one Contracting State pro-
vides access to (or offers) an electronic application,
Notes
164 See OECD, 2018 Interim Report, supra n. 1, paras 273–274.
165 See also Committee of Experts, supra n. 5, paras 43–44.
166 Petruzzi & Holzinger also discuss that allocation of risks and returns for the purpose of Arts 7 and 9 should be similar in the post BEPS world. R. Petruzzi & R. Holzinger,
Profit Attribution to Dependent Agent Permanent Establishment in a Post-BEPS Era, 9(2) World Tax J. 263, 294 (2017). See also K. Dziurdz, Attribution of Functions and Profits to a
Dependent Agent PE: Different Arm’s Length Principles Under Articles 7(2) and 9?, 6(2) World Tax J. 135, 138 (2014).
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database, online marketplace, storage room or offers
advertising services on a website or in an electronic
application used by more than 1,000 individual users
per month domiciled in the other Contracting State,
such enterprise shall be deemed to have a permanent
establishment in the other Contracting State if the total
amount of revenue of the enterprise due to the afore-
mentioned services in the Contracting State exceeds
XXX (EUR, USD, GBP, CNY, CHF, etc.) per
annum.167
Furthermore, among several solutions discussed in the
BEPS Action 1 Final Report, the OECD suggested the
introduction of a significant economic presence test for
digital businesses. This test proposes to create a new nexus
based on either revenue, digital or user related factors, or a
combination thereof.168 The EU Commission, as a long-
term solution, has also put forward a similar proposal to
introduce a Digital PE. According to this proposal, a
Digital PE arises in a Member State when the digital
services provided through a digital interface either (1)
exceeds a revenue threshold (Euro 7,000,000) or (2) the
number of users availing the digital services exceeds
100,000 users or (3) the number of business contracts
for digital services concluded by users in a Member State
exceeds 3,000 contracts.169
3.1.2 Allocation of Profits to the New Nexus
3.1.2.1 Modifying the Existing Attribution
of Profits Framework (AOA Approach)
As discussed (supra section 2.3), under the current frame-
work, profit attribution to a PE depends on physical factors
in the market state such as significant people functions
performed in the PE or for the PE in the PE state or assets
located in the PE state. If the non-resident enterprise does
not have such physical affiliation, the income attributable
to the PE may be negligible.170 Thus, alternate options
may have to be considered to attribute profits to the digital
PE or the significant economic presence.
In this regard, Pistone and Hongler suggest a modifi-
cation of the existing profit split method with an upfront
allocation of a partial profit to the market jurisdiction.
Specifically, they assert that the market jurisdiction will
receive an upfront allocation of one third of the profit
following the relation between domestic and overall rev-
enues. Thereafter, the balance of two thirds will be split
on the basis of existing transfer pricing principles.171
Pistone and Hongler do not substantiate the reason for
allocating one third of the profit to the market
jurisdiction,172 nor do they discuss how the current trans-
fer pricing principles should be used to split two thirds of
the profits.
On the other hand, the OECD states that several
adjustments to the existing principles were considered to
allocate profits to the new significant economic presence
nexus. For example, depending on the circumstances, the
significant economic presence could be allocated business
functions handled remotely through automated systems
(typically, in cloud computing businesses that do not rely
on active user participation) or the customers and users
could be considered to perform certain functions on behalf
of the non-resident enterprise173 (typically, in multi-sided
business models that rely on active user participation).
Overall, changes will need to be made to the authorized
OECD approach if the new nexus is introduced in the
form of a significant economic presence PE, and clarifica-
tions will have to be made as regards both steps of the
authorized OECD approach, in particular as to whether
automated functions or functions related to users/custo-
mers or data gathered from such users/customers can
constitute significant people functions.
In fact, with respect to profit attribution to the sig-
nificant digital presence, the EU Commission’s proposal
states that under the first step of the authorized OECD
approach, a functional analysis needs to be performed. In
this regard, it is stated that ‘In order to determine the
functions of, and attribute the economic ownership of
assets and risks to, the significant digital presence, the
economically significant activities performed by such pre-
sence through a digital interface shall be taken into
account. For this purpose, activities undertaken by the
enterprise through a digital interface related to data or
users shall be considered economically significant activ-
ities of the significant digital presence which attribute
risks and the economic ownership of assets to such
presence’.174 In other words, functions, assets and risks
Notes
167 P. Hongler & P. Pistone, Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income in the Era of the Digital Economy, IBFD Working Paper 1, 3 (2015).
168 OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, at 107–111.
169 See European Commission, supra n. 27. See also European Commission, European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of
a significant digital presence, supra n. 59, art. 4(3).
170 E.g. Hongler & Pistone, supra n. 167, at 2.
171 Ibid., at 34–35.
172 Ibid., at 34.
173 OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, at 111–112. Another approach that was considered pertains to replacing a functional analysis with a bargaining power analysis that
is based on game theory principles.
174 See European Commission, supra n. 27, art. 5(3)
A Long-Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized Business Models
491
that relate to data or users in the market State shall be
attributed to such a digital PE even if all these activities
are performed at the level of the head office. Moreover, the
profit attribution principles should take into account the
development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and
exploitation of intangible assets. Furthermore, with
respect to the second step, it is stated that taxpayers
should use the profit split method to allocate profits to
such a digital presence unless and until the application of
another method is put forward. It is indicated that further
guidance on such rules will be developed in the due course
of time.175
3.1.2. 2Deemed Profit Mechanism
Another approach that was dealt by the OECD relates
to a deemed profits mechanism. This method, initially,
deems the significant economic presence to be equiva-
lent to a physical presence from which the non-resident
enterprise is operating a business. Thereafter, the
method determines deemed net income of the signifi-
cant economic presence by applying a ratio of presumed
expenses to the non-resident enterprise’s revenue
derived from transactions concluded with customers in
the market jurisdiction. Notably, the OECD states that
the ratio could be determined on the basis of a number
of factors, such as by making references to industry
profit margins of domestic taxpayers. For example an
online advertiser (non-resident enterprise) could be clas-
sified under the advertisement industry and its nexus
(significant economic presence) would be allocated prof-
its on the basis of profit margins derived by comparable
advertisement businesses in the market state. Thus, a
comparability analysis would be required.
While the approach could be easy to administer, it is
acknowledged that it may be difficult to ascertain indus-
try-specific presumptive profit margins for taxpayers oper-
ating in many lines of business. Moreover, several
expense-related adjustments might be required to the
industry margins, especially when the comparable busi-
nesses consist of traditional businesses.176
3.1.2. 3 Formulary Apportionment
The OECD also discusses a formulary apportionment
mechanism. The mechanism aims to apportion the
profits of the whole enterprise to the significant eco-
nomic presence, either on the basis of a predetermined
formula or on the basis of variable allocation factors
determined on a case-by-case basis.177 However, the
OECD states that such an option is not desirable, as
it departs significantly from current international tax
policy standards.178
3.2 Perspective of the Authors: New Nexus and
Profit Attribution Rules for all Enterprises
In order to appropriately tax the profits of digital
business models, Olbert and Spengel argue that the
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines need to be
amended. Essentially, they propose that a proper func-
tional or value chain analysis needs to be carried out to
understand the roles and responsibilities of all the enti-
ties in the multinational group.179 In particular, they
stress that when the staff of the related local entity
carries out core value adding functions for digital busi-
nesses (software or sales related functions), those func-
tions cannot be considered to be routine in nature.
Consequently, as high value added functions are per-
formed, the profit split method should be applied to
split the profits between the local entity and the non-
resident entity. Thus, the taxpayer in the market state
should be compensated appropriately. By following
such an approach, the market state can tax additional
income.180 While such an approach is more than wel-
come, the issue still remains as to how digital busi-
nesses are to be taxed that operate on a remote basis, i.
e. without any market state presence in the form of
related local entities or activities.
One of the policy options is to create a new nexus in the
form of a digital PE or significant economic presence PE for
digital businesses, in particular, highly digitalized
businesses.181 However, in the present authors’ opinion,
Notes
175 See European Commission, supra n. 27, Art. 5(3) to Art. 5(5). See also HM Treasury, Corporate Tax and the Digital Economy: Position Paper Update (Mar. 2018). On the issue of a
possible new nexus and the authorized OECD approach, Petruzzi & Buriak also provide a solution. They firstly argue that the digital PE concept needs to be developed on
the basis of ‘value creation’. However, the authors themselves state that such a definition creates tax uncertainty for businesses. Secondly, the authors, by referring to the
example of a social network, state that the profits attributable to a digital PE should be based on the difference between the revenues derived from exploiting the data
generated from the PE State as reduced by costs associated with data collection and data processing. See R. Petruzzi & S. Buriak, Addressing the Tax Challenges of Digitalization
of the Economy – A Possible Answer to the in the Proper Application of Transfer Pricing Rules, 72(4a) Intl. Transfer Pricing J. (2018).
176 OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, at 112–113.
177 On that subject, see e.g. L. U. Cavelti, C. Jaag & T. F. Rohner, Why Corporate Taxation Should Mean Source Taxation: A Response to the OECD’s Actions Against Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting, 9(3) World Tax J. 352 (2017); R. Avi-Yonah, K. A. Clausing & M. C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit
Split, Michigan Public Law Working Paper No. 138 (University of Michigan Law & Economics 2008).
178 OECD, Action 1 Final Report, supra n. 1, at 112.
179 Olbert & Spengel, supra n. 38, at 41. See also de Jong, Neuvel & Uceda, supra n. 35, at 7.
180 Olbert & Spengel, supra n. 38, at 42.
181 A selected group of States support this proposal. See OECD, 2018 Interim Report, supra n. 1, para. 389.
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that option is loaded with challenges. First, it could be rather
difficult to define nexus to capture all digital businesses. For
example the proposal put forward by Hongler and Pistone as
well as by the OECD, in addition to a revenue threshold,
makes reference to monthly individual users. In some digital
businesses, users play an active role (social network plat-
forms), while in others, they may not (cloud computing
businesses). The question then may arise as to why a user
threshold is necessary for the latter type of businesses.
Further, as rightly pointed out by the UN, such monthly
thresholds could be circumvented and the concepts used in
the definition could become obsolete. Also, they ‘may not
create equity when the different sizes of the population are
taken into consideration’.182 This being said, and as evi-
denced by the Proposal of the European
Commission, nexus rules can surely be designed for selected
digital business models on the basis of either revenue or user
related factors. Second, and most critically, it is extremely
challenging to develop new attribution rules for digitalized
businesses. Several options discussed (supra section 3.1.2)
above could surely be considered on a standalone basis or
on a combined basis. Against this background, the most
favourable option seems to focus on amending the authorized
OECD approach. Nevertheless, as illustrated in the case
studies in section 2, the authorized OECD approach is itself
unsettled and unclear. Moreover, profit attribution standards
are not uniform. Therefore, building new rules on an
unstable foundation will surely cause tax uncertainty for
businesses and open the doors for tax disputes.
One might also raise the question as to why there should
be a new nexus and new attribution rules only for digita-
lized businesses? If one seeks to move in this direction,
should not the new rules apply to ‘all enterprises’ in a
neutral, efficient, simple and certain, fair and equal, as
well as flexible manner?183 The authors agree with this
position and have the opinion that national and interna-
tional tax principles for conventional as well as e-commerce
should be the same. Accordingly, new nexus and new
attribution rules should be developed for all enterprises
and unless and until such new rules are developed we also
believe that simpler targeted bilateral solutions should be
considered to tax digitalized businesses, in particular,
highly digitalized businesses (see supra section 4).
With respect to defining a nexus, a reference could be
made to the recent Indian approach. To elaborate, India
has opted for such an approach and recently introduced a
significant economic presence test in its domestic tax law
(supra section 1.3). The test applies to all enterprises when
they exceed either a revenue based or user-based
threshold.184 Therefore, in order to ensure quality
between traditional commerce and electronic commerce,
new nexus rules could be built on such thresholds.
Secondly, with respect to profit allocation, the rules need
to apply in a similar manner for all businesses. At the outset,
we would like to state that ‘full’ formulary approaches should
not be pursued as they conflict with the arm’s length
standard. A solution needs to be found within the existing
arm’s length standard by either putting forward a new
interpretation or introducing formulary approaches within
the standard. The former approach puts forward a new
interpretation that the functions, assets and risks performed
at the level of the head office in relation to sales made into
the PE State could be attributed to the new nexus. In fact,
the recent work of the OECD on profit attribution in the
context of BEPS Action 7 (see section 2.4), although unclear,
as well as the work of the EU Commission in the context of
the significant digital presence proposal (see section 3.1.2)
provides a basis to reach this conclusion. The latter approach
modifies the arm’s length principle and moves from a func-
tions, assets and risks (FAR) analysis to a functions, assets,
risks and market (FARM) analysis. This approach takes into
consideration demand side factors (such as the market in
which sales are made). For instance, the new nexus could be
attributed a certain percentage of profits derived from sales
into the market jurisdiction. A detailed analysis of these new
concepts is outside the scope of this contribution.
4 TARGETED SOLUTION FOR HIGHLY
DIGITALIZED BUSINESSES: A NEW
DISTRIBUTIVE RULE ON SPECIFIED DIGITAL
SERVICES OR ACTIVITIES
An alternate solution would involve the introduction of a
new distributive rule in tax treaties that would deal with
fees for specified digital services or activities. The distribu-
tive rule could be developed on the basis of the distributive
rules currently found in Article 10 (dividends) or Article 11
(interest) of the OECD Model185 (2017) or Article 12
(royalties) of the UN Model186 (2011) or the proposed
Article 12A of the forthcoming updated UN Model.187 A
high level overview of the solution is discussed here.
Notes
182 Committee of Experts, supra n. 5, para. 23.
183 OECD, Electronic Commerce: Taxation Framework Conditions, OECD Publishing, para. 9 (1998). A selected group of States support this proposal. See OECD, 2018 Interim
Report, supra n. 1, para. 391.
184 Clarifications are expected with respect to both thresholds and attribution rules. See Government of India, supra n. 67.
185 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017, supra. n. 40.
186 UN Model, supra n. 120.
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Paragraph 1 of the provision would provide that the
residence state may tax income from specified digital
services or activities. Paragraph 2, on the other hand,
would provide that the source (market) state may tax the
income from specified digital services or activities if that
income exceeds a certain amount (an amount threshold
needs to be put in place). However, the tax so charged will
be the lesser of either a certain percentage of gross revenues
or profits taxed under a net mechanism. The net mechan-
ism will be developed on the basis of deemed profit
mechanisms. Paragraph 3 would define the specified digi-
tal services or activities that are to be covered by this
provision. The authors are of the initial opinion that such
a provision should cover digitalized businesses which
provide an online marketplace for the sale of goods and
services, online services and online solutions such as cloud
computing services, in particular, business that provide
infrastructure and platforms as a service (IaaS and PaaS).
The provision could also be extended to businesses that
sell digitalized products through an online platform.
Notably, the provision should not cover businesses that
own and sell/purchase and resell physical products
through an online platform (supra section 1.2.1).
Paragraph 4 would provide that if the income is connected
to a PE, the provisions dealing with business profits take
precedence. Paragraph 5 would provide sourcing rules.
Finally, paragraph 6 would contain a special relationship
provision. The provision could be implemented through
bilateral negotiations or the MLI. A detailed analysis of
this solution will be presented in a subsequent article.
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